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Abstract 
The administration of the criminal justice system tries to strike a balance 
between the search for truth and the fairness of the process. To this end, the law 
should protect individual rights and impose various legal burdens on the state. 
One such tool is the principle of the presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty. This is a constitutional principle under Ethiopian l w and requires the 
public prosecutor to prove each element constituting the crime which, as argued 
in this article, should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, this 
principle is being violated by various subsidiary laws, procedures and practices. 
First, there are various provisions in the criminal law that limit (or arguably 
disregard) this constitutional principle. Such criminal law provisions assume as 
proved the existence of some of the elements of certain crimes without 
requiring the public prosecutor to submit evidence. S cond, the Criminal 
Justice Administration Policy adopted in 2011 contemplates shifting the burden 
of proof to the defendant in selected serious crimes. Third, the courts also 
wrongly shift burden of proof to the accused regarding certain facts in various 
court decisions. These laws and judicial practices d prive the accused of the 
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This article, inter alia, 
examines the constitutionality of such shifting of the burden of proof and also 
analyzes the standards of proof that are required in criminal cases in the 
Ethiopian context.  
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Introduction 
The state has the primary responsibility of detection, apprehension, prosecution 
and conviction of offenders. In this process, the accused always faces the mighty 
state and this challenges the fairness of the criminal justice system. Using 
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various tools, the law tries to maintain the balance between the search for truth 
and ensure the fairness of the process. The criminal justice system is expected to 
maintain the rights of the individual even when this at times seems to go against 
the search for truth. The law does so by affording the individual certain 
protections, such as, the presumption of innocence u til proven guilty before a 
competent, independent and impartial court and by imposing on the state the 
duty of proving each ingredient that constitutes the crime.  
Presumption of innocence is a restatement of the rule that in criminal matters 
the public prosecutor has the burden of proving guilt of the accused in order for 
the accused to be convicted of the crime he is charged with. Burden of proof has 
two elements: the first element is evidentiary burden, i.e. producing evidence in 
support of one's allegation, while the second element r lates to the burden of 
persuasion (also referred to as the legal burden), which is the obligation of the 
party to convince the court that the evidence tendered proves the party's 
assertion of facts. This distinction and its consequences are not appreciated in 
Ethiopia’s legal system.  
The allocation of burden of proof is complicated byfactors, such as, 
affirmative defences and presumptions which are considered to be exceptions 
thereby shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Moreover, the 
determination of the elements of the crime is a formidable task because often, all 
the elements may not be found in a single provision that defines the crime. 
There is also lack of clarity regarding the rules and/or the practice relating to the 
standards of proof.  
The central issue relating to the presumption of innocence and burden of 
proof in Ethiopia’s legal system is a matter of constitutionality. The FDRE 
Constitution recognises the principle of presumption of innocence and there is 
no exception/limitation to this principle. However, there are provisions in the 
Criminal Code that allow proof of facts constituting an element of a crime, 
mainly intention or knowledge, by presumption. In some cases, the public 
prosecutor does not even have to prove any basic facts or those facts to be 
deemed to exist. Some of the provisions even preclud  contrary proof of facts 
that are presumed to exist. The Criminal Justice Administration Policy (the 
Policy) adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2011 anticipates shifting the 
burden of proof to the defendant in some serious crimes. Moreover, courts 
routinely impose the burden of proof on the defendant. These state actions and 
legislative provisions that shift the burden of proof to the defendant not only 
restrict (and sometimes nullify) the constitutional principle of presumption of 
innocence, but also negatively impact the fairness of the criminal justice system 
administration in a fundamental way.  
Section 1 of the article discusses the debate in the administration of criminal 
justice. The themes of the discourse include how the criminal justice system 
should balance the detection, apprehension, prosecution and conviction of 
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offenders and also ensure the rights of the suspect or accused. In so doing, it 
examines some of the constitutional provisions thatstrike a balance between the 
utilitarian approach to the crime control model and the process value model. It 
further examines the challenges posed by the subsidiary laws and the practice 
against such balance in value choices as enshrined in the Constitution. Section 2 
highlights the concept of burden of proof, its elements, allocation of burden of 
proof, presumption of innocence; elements that constitute an offence that need 
proof and standards of proof. Section 3 dwells on whether such burden of proof 
on the prosecution may be shifted to the defendant by affirmative defences and 
presumptions. As the central theme of this article is shifting the burden of proof 
to the defendant by presumptions, it discusses presumptions as they exist in the 
law and as are contemplated in the Policy. Finally, the last section discusses 
burden of proof where there is alleged coercion to extort confessions during 
police investigation.  
1. Values Choice Debates in Criminal Justice 
Administration 
The criminal process is tuned at a particular point in he continuum of two 
extremes. On the one hand, it pursues the repression of criminal conduct by 
“detection, apprehension, prosecution and punishment of offenders,” which is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘crime control model;’ on the other hand, it deals 
with the protection of the rights of the suspect in the administration of the 
criminal justice, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘due process model’.1  It 
is a matter of policy of the state whether a criminal justice administration 
inclines in the direction of crime control or due process. Even though, such 
choice is certainly influenced by the political ideology of the system, the state 
endeavours to maintain a balance between crime control and due process in 
view of their interdependence.2  Thus, the law keeps a balance between the two 
values.3  
                                          
1  J. Griffiths (1970) “Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third ‘Model’ in the Criminal 
Process” in 79 The Yale L.J No. 3, at 363, 364, 366. 
2  The political ideology of a state manifests itself by (and very much influences) the 
justice system, and especially in the administration of its criminal justice. A liberal 
and democratic society, generally, inclines toward  liberal criminal justice system 
administration; an authoritarian political system has an illiberal criminal process; and 
there are those that are in between. 
3 The adjective laws are addressed to officials who are “properly qualified to execute 
the commands of the legislature” particularly in the administration of the criminal 
justice. [footnotes omitted] G. J. Postema (1977) “The Principle of Utility and the Law 
of Procedure: Bentham's Theory of Adjudication” in 11 Georgia L. Rev., at 1398. 
 
 
276                                        MIZAN LAW REVIEW                             Vol. 6 No.2, December 2012 
     
Persons in public office generally tend to favour the principle of utility, and 
the utility of adjective law is seen only in the context of adjudication.4 The 
application of the principle of utility in the administration of the criminal justice 
aims at maximizing the correct results5 by minimizing the direct and error 
(moral) costs in the application of the substantive law.6 Those moral costs for 
the acquittal of the guilty and the conviction of the innocent are expressed in 
terms of low public confidence in the administration f the criminal justice.7 In 
order to minimize the moral cost, the criminal justice tolerates very little error; 
thus, the public prosecutor must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8  
However, in as much as truth is an essential value, it is not an overriding value; 
there are what are called “process values”9 or “inherent process values”.10 
Procedures have values that are worth pursuing independent of correct outcome, 
although they incidentally also help achieve a correct outcome.11 Therefore, the 
                                          
4 The purpose of adjudication is rectitude of decision - the correct interpretation of laws 
and application to the facts. Therefore, the adjectiv  law has to maximise those correct 
decisions. T. Anderson, D. Schum and W. Twining (2005) Analysis of Evidence, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at 83, 84; M. Bayles (1986) “Principles for 
Legal Procedure” in 5 Law and Philosophy, at  45; Postema, supra note 3, at 1397. 
5  Bayles, supra note 4, at 41. Those correct outcomes are conviction of the guilty and 
acquittal of the innocent. 
6 B. D. Underwood (1977) "The Thumb on the Scale of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion 
in Criminal Cases" in 86 Yale L. J., at 1307, 1330; Bayles, upra note 4, at 46, 47; 
Postema, supra note 3, at 1396, 97. 
7 Bayles, supra note 4, at 46, 47 
8 Bayels, Id., at 45; Postma, supra note 3, at 1397. The ‘rationalist approach’ to proof in 
adjudication is based on three assumptions. First, it assumes litigation has its objective 
as the pursuit of truth through a rational process. Second, the pursuit of truth in 
adjudication is a high but not an overriding objective of justice. And third, pursuit of 
truth through reason is only a means to achieving the ends of substantive law. 
Anderson, Schum and Twining, supra note 4, at 79. This rationalist approach to 
adjudication is reflected in modern procedure and evi ence laws including ours. For 
instance, the provisions relating to investigation a d proof both in the civil and 
criminal procedure provisions as well as the various s bstantive legislations reflect the 
epistemological aspect of adjudication. The Constitution on the other hand contains 
several provisions that reflect the "process value" in the administration of the criminal 
justice system. 
9 R. S. Summers (1974) “Evaluating and Improving Legal Process - A Plea for ‘Process 
Values’ ” in 60 Cornell L. Rev. No. 1, at 3. 
10  Bayles, supra note 4, at 51. 
11 Summers supra note 9, at 3, 4. Also see, Bayles, supra note 4, at 50, 51. Summers 
also catalogues process values some of which are: Process Legitimacy, at 21, Process 
Peacefulness, at 22, Humaneness and Respect for Human Dignity, at 23, Personal 
Privacy, at 24, Procedural Rule of Law, at 25, and Procedural Rationality, at 26. 
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criminal process tries to balance the manifestation of truth (as the foundation of 
justice) and the process values (as expressions of fairness). This balance of 
values is made in the Ethiopian Constitution.  
1.1. The Constitutional Value Choice 
The law has many tools that focus on the fairness of the process independent of 
the correctness of outcome of the process. These tools include the principle of 
the presumption of innocence of the accused until proven guilty and the 
obligation of the state to prove each ingredient tha constitutes the crime. The 
Constitution has fairly balanced the rule of law and the crime control models. It 
has clear and detailed provisions regarding the rights of the accused, the arrested 
or the convicted person; and this is unusual for a constitution.12  
The Constitution provides that, “human rights and freedoms emanating from 
the nature of mankind, are inviolable and inalienable”.13 Many of the 
constitutional rights relating to the administration f the criminal justice system 
emanate from the recognition of the natural rights of the person, such as, the 
right to life, liberty and personal security.  
Although Article 17 of the Constitution deals with te right to liberty, it is 
also a restatement of the due process of law. It provides that “... [n]o one shall 
be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedure as are established by law”.14 [Emphasis added.] It further 
provides that “[n]o person may be subjected to arbitrary arrest, and no person 
may be detained without a charge or conviction against him”.15 The Constitution 
also prohibits “...cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.16 The 
arrested person shall not be compelled to make confessions or admissions which 
                                                                                                 
Some of those process values are also discussed in one or another form by Bayles, 
supra note 4, at 53-56; for a similar but different perspective, see J. Thibau and L. 
Walker (1978) "Theories of procedure" in 66 California L. Rev., at 541 – 543. 
12 D. A. Donovan (2002) “Leveling the Playing Field: The Judicial Duty to Protect and 
Enforce the Constitutional Rights of the Accused Persons Unrepresented by 
Counsel.” 1 Eth. L. Rev., at 32, 33; Wondwossen Demissie (2000) “The Role of 
Courts in the Enforcement of Constitutional Rights of Suspects” Proceedings of the 
Symposium on the Role of Courts in the Enforcement of the Constitution. Addis 
Ababa: ECSC, at 45-47. 
13 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Const. Art 10(1). 
14  In order for a suspect to be detained, there mustbe a substantive law which imposes a 
sentence of imprisonment and there must be a procedure which provides for the 
manner and the requirements of arrest. In the absence of either of this, a person may 
not be arrested.  
15  Arbitrary arrest is effected under circumstances where either of the above 
requirements is not met.  
16  FDRE Const. Art 18(1). 
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would be used in evidence against him. It is further provided that, “[a]ny 
evidence obtained under coercion shall not be admissible”.17 The arrested person 
has the right to be promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest (during his 
arrest and when he appears in court within 48 hours).18 The arrested person also 
has the right to remain silent and the right to be informed that any statement he 
makes may be used in evidence against him in court.19 The arrested person has 
the right to file a petition to a court for his physical release;20 and has the right to 
be released on bail.21  
The Constitution has extensive provisions regarding the rights of the accused. 
The accused has the right to trial by an ordinary court of law within a reasonable 
time.22 He has the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges with sufficient 
particulars.23 The accused has the right to have full access to any evidence 
presented against him, to examine witnesses testifying against him, to present 
evidence or have witnesses produced in his own defenc , and to obtain the 
attendance of and examination of witnesses on his behalf before the court.24 He 
has the right to be represented by a counsel and to be assisted by an interpreter.25 
Another right of the accused, which constitutes the core theme of this article, is 
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.26 It is 
further provided that the accused may not be compelled to testify against 
himself.27  
The Constitution is the supreme law because “[a]ny law, customary practice 
or a decision of an organ of a state or a public offi ial which contravenes [the] 
Constitution shall be of no effect.”28 The Constitution requires “[a]ll Federal and 
State legislative, executive and judicial organs at all levels ... to respect and 
enforce” the provisions relating to individual rights and freedoms.29 It is evident 
from the readings of these provisions that the crafting and application of any 
                                          
17  Id., Art 19(5). 
18  Id., Art 19(1), (3). 
19  Id., Art 19(2). 
20  Id., Art 19(4). 
21  Id., Art 19(6). 
22  Id., Art 20(1). 
23  Id., Art 20(2). 
24  Id., Art 20(4). 
25  Id., Art 20(5), (7). 
26  The PDR Ethiopia Constitution had similar provisions. Art 45(1) provides that “[n]o 
person criminally accused of violating the law shall be considered guilty unless it is 
so determined by a court.” The Amharic version of the provision is much more closer 
to the provisions of the current Constitution.  
27  FDRE Const. Art 20(3). 
28  Id., Art 9(1). 
29  Id., Art 13(1). 
 
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND ITS CHALLENGES IN THE  ETHN CR. PROCESS       279 
 
legislation may be made only in accordance with the Constitution. Moreover, 
any criminal investigation and prosecution should observe these minimum 
standards.  
There are provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code that are meant to 
further the values enshrined in the Constitution.30 Regarding the due process 
aspect of the administration of the criminal justice, there are provisions relating 
to the right of the suspect or defendant to remain silent,31 to be released on 
bail,32 protecting the suspect against unreasonable search and seizure,33 to be 
treated with dignity,34 to be visited by relatives and religious fathers,35 to be 
represented by an attorney,36 to have access to and examine prosecution 
witnesses,37  to present his defence,38 and to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty by the prosecution.39 These are the inherent process values of the 
administration of the criminal justice. 
From the crime control perspective, the Constitution embodies provisions 
that deal with the detection, apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of 
offenders in order to promote public and state security. In this regard, there are 
provisions that restrict the rights of the suspect or the accused. For instance, 
there are restrictions on the right to liberty; thus, a suspect may be arrested in 
accordance with the provisions of the laws of criminal procedure.40 Under 
exceptional circumstances prescribed by law, the court may deny bail41 and keep 
the arrested person in custody. 42 Or the court may remand the arrested person 
                                          
30  It is to be noted that the Criminal Procedure Code was drafted several decades before 
the current Constitution. However, the issue of balancing the crime control duty of 
the state and due process of the law is inherent in the administration of the criminal 
justice. Thus, there is substantial congruence between the Criminal Procedure Code 
enacted in 1961 and the FDRE Constitution enacted in 1994.   
31  Art 27. 
32  Arts 59 ff. 
33  Arts 32 & 33. 
34  In effecting arrest of the suspect where there is “submission to his custody by word or 
action”, the arresting officer may not use any force or may not even touch the body of 
the arrestee (Art 56(3)). During the hearing, the law prohibits chaining the defendant 
“unless there is a good reason to believe that he is dangerous, may be violent or may 
try to escape” (Art 127(2)). The law also requires that the arrestee be detained on the 
conditions that are prescribed for prison (Art 60). 
35  Art 60. 
36  Art 61, 127(1). 
37  Art 136(2), 137. 
38  Art 142. 
39  Arts 141, 142. 
40  FDRE Const. Art 17(1). 
41  Art 19(4), (6). 
42  Art 19(4). 
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for a time strictly required to carry out the necessary investigation,43 or demand 
adequate guarantees for his conditional release.44 The rights of privacy, 
arguably, may be restricted for the purpose of crime investigation.45 The 
Criminal Procedure Code is mostly in conformity with the spirit of the 
Constitution. Articles 11-21 deal with the initiation of investigation; and 
Articles 22-39 and 49-79 provide for investigation a d other police activities 
pending investigation. Particularly relevant to the discussion, Articles 32-33 
deal with search and seizure while Articles 49-59 deal with arrest and Articles 
60-79 deal with bail and remand. Articles 40-48 provide for the prosecution of 
the suspect; and, finally, Articles 94-159 deal with the trial of the case. 
1.2. The Challenges to the Constitutional Model of the 
Criminal Process 
The Constitution is clear in its value choice and it balances the interests of the 
public and of the individual in the administration of the criminal justice.46 
However, there are constant challenges to this constitutional value choice. A 
preliminary examination of both the laws in force and the practice in the 
administration of the criminal justice shows that the constitutional value choice 
is given a marginal place. This is because there are several procedural laws that 
overextend their scope and functions of crime control to the extent that they 
contravene the due process provisions in the Constitution. In fact, these 
subsidiary laws expressly provide – both in their preambles47 and in the 
                                          
43  Id. 
44  FDRE Const. Art 19(4), (6). 
45  Id., Art 26. This provision never includes a pending vestigation as a ground for 
restriction of the right to privacy. Sub-article 3 provides that “...[n]o restrictions may 
be placed on the enjoyment of such rights except in compelling circumstances and in 
accordance with specific laws whose purposes shall be the safeguarding of national 
security or public peace, the prevention of crimes or the protection of health, public 
morality or the rights and freedoms of others.” 
46  In the ordinary parlance there appears to be a distinction between the ‘public interest’ 
and the ‘private interest;’ and protection of the rights of the individual is considered a 
private interest. However, the protection of the constitutional rights of the individual 
is also a public interest in that if a state power is not constitutionally limited there is 
no guarantee that every member of the public will not be subjected to the arbitrary 
action of the state. The concepts ‘public interest’ and ‘private interest’ with apparent 
distinction are used here only as a matter of convenience and for clarity of ideas 
during these discussions. 
47  Unlike the practice in the common law system, the preamble is an important part of 
the concerned legislation in the civil law system. It is the policy justification for the 
adoption of the legislation; as such, it is important to understand the legislative intent 
in the interpretation and application of the substantive part of that legislation.  
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substance of their provisions – that they aim at the crime control aspect of the 
duty of the state. Such are the preambles of the anti-corruption, the vagrancy 
control and the anti-terrorism proclamations.48  
These laws modify the mainstream criminal procedure embodied in the 
Criminal Procedure Code, in order to meet their prime objective; i.e., 
suppression of crime. They modify several important procedures, such as, bail,49 
remand,50 admissibility of evidence,51 etc. Many of the modifications are 
directed to the practice rather than the law, because there were no express 
provisions governing those areas where modification was sought by these 
laws.52 Ironically, these laws were adopted after the coming into force of the 
Constitution, and yet they are contrary to the Constitution. In this regard we can 
the standard of proof for confiscation of property for crimes of corruption,53 
                                          
48  The Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation No. 
236/2001, the Vagrancy Control Proclamation No. 384/2004, and the Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation No 652/2009, respectively.  
49  Bail in the initial anti-corruption legislation was governed by the rules of the 
Criminal Procedure Code as there was no such provision n the Proclamation (Proc. 
No 236/2001). Later it was amended and the crime of corruption was made non-
bailable offence (Proc. No. 239/2001, Art 2). However, it was further amended in 
order to make only those corruption offences that are punishable by a term of more 
than 10 years imprisonment non-bailable (Proc. No 434/2005, Art 4(1)). The crime of 
vagrancy is made non-bailable from the very beginning (Proc. No. 384/2004, Art 
6(3)).  
50  The dangerous vagrancy law extended the period of remand form a maximum of 14 
days to 28 days (Art 7). So does the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 (Art 
20(3)). 
51  The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation contains a list of admissible evidence which would 
not be admissible (Art 23(1), (2) & (4)). 
52  There is no evidence or procedural rule that governs the issue of hostile witness. 
However, the anti-corruption legislation introduces the concept of hostile witnesses 
and allows the prosecutor to ask leading questions during the examination in chief of 
its witnesses (Proc. No 236/2001, Art 40). Likewise, there is no provision in the law 
that exhaustively lists admissible evidence or setsforth certain standards by which 
admissibility could be tested. However, the anti-terrorism legislation puts in place 
provisions regarding the admissibility of specific evidence in such cases, (Proc. No. 
652/2009, Art 23(1), (2) & (4)). There were no express provisions that affirmatively 
state the standards of proof in civil and criminal matters. However, the anti-
corruption proclamation expressly provides for standards of proof in application for 
Confiscation of property acquired by corruption (Proc. No 236/2001, Arts 23 and 24). 
53  Confiscation of property is a penalty as provided for under the Criminal Code, Art 
98. Sentence of imprisonment or confiscation of prope ty is contingent upon proof of 
criminal guilt and conduct. Therefore, the crime should be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt before the court rules on whether defendant's property should be confiscated.  
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burden of proof in corruption cases in general,54 and admissibility of specific 
categories of evidence.55 Even when there are provisions that conform to the 
values of the Constitution, the practice in the administration of justice restricts 
the rights of the suspect and deviates from what the law provides.56  
The Criminal Justice Administration Policy adopted on March 4, 2011 by the 
Council of Ministers contemplates transforming the criminal justice 
administration.57 The Policy positively envisages the improvement of the 
criminal justice system. However, it has, at least, one major predicament; it 
tends to shift the burden of proof to the accused by the use of presumptions in a 
few serious crimes, such as, crimes against the Constitution and the 
constitutional order, acts of terrorism, crimes of c rruption and organised crimes 
stated in the Policy.58 A brief introduction to the Policy is, thus, approiate.  
1.3. Overview of the Criminal Justice Administration Policy 
The Policy is meant to foster efficiency, expediency and fairness in the slow and 
weak administration of the criminal justice system.59 The Policy introduces new 
                                          
54  It is argued in this article that the constitutional principle of presumption of 
innocence dictates that the public prosecutor has the burden of proving each 
ingredient constituting a crime the accused is charged with beyond a reasonable 
doubt; thus, an element of a crime cannot be proved by presumptions. See section 3.2 
of this text.    
55  The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No 652/2009, Art 23 provides that “(1) 
intelligence report prepared in relation to terrorism, even if the report does 
not disclose the source or the method it was gathered” and “(2) hearsay or 
indirect evidences,” among others, are admissible. These evidence are not 
practically subject to test by defendant; therefore, such restrictions violate the 
constitutional right of defendant to examine evidence presented against him as 
enshrined under FDRE Constitution, Art 20(4). 
56  See Simeneh Kiros Assefa (2010) “The Normative, Institutional and Practical 
Challenges in the Administration of the Criminal Justice in Ethiopia” in Ethiopian 
Human Rights Law Series Vol. III ; Centre for International Legal Cooperation 
(2005) Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program Baseline Research Report 
(Addis Ababa: FDRE Ministry of Capacity Building) (hereinafter ‘Baseline Research 
Report’)  
57  See the last paragraph of Introduction of the Criminal Justice Administration Policy 
(‘The Policy’).  
58  The Policy, Section 4.6. 
59  The former Federal Ministry of Capacity Building had commissioned foreign 
consultants to conduct a baseline research on the stat of the Ethiopian criminal 
justice administration. The findings of the research depicts a very gloomy and sad 
picture of the state of the criminal justice system administration. Baseline Research 
Report, supra note 56. There are also other researches on the various aspects of the 
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concepts and processes, such as, plea bargain60 reopening of a case after final 
judgment,61 prioritizing cases for investigation and prosecution,62 exclusionary 
rules for evidence unlawfully obtained,63 and diversion, both in terms of process 
and punishment.64 It has also greatly modified the investigation process both by 
granting broader supervision power to the public prosecutor65 and by 
introducing new (and arguably modern) investigation processes, such as, 
infiltration and secret surveillance, interception f private communication, both 
with or without court warrant, protection of informants and agents, and non-
prosecution of a person who participated in a crime.66 The policy also addresses 
the longstanding problem relating to the gathering, preservation and return of 
exhibits67 by granting in the matter full power to the Public Prosecutor.68  
                                                                                                 
criminal justice system.  See, Simeneh Kiros, supra note 56; Worku Yaze Wodage 
(2010) “Presumption of Innocence and the Requirement of Proof Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt: Reflections on Meaning, Scope and their Place under Ethiopian Law” in 
Ethiopian Human Rights Law Series Vol. III, Ali Mohammed Ali (2003) “The Role 
of Courts, Police and Prosecution in the Respect and Enforcement of Human Rights” 
(title in Amharic) A discussion paper presented at a workshop organised for Federal 
Judges, Prosecutors and Police), Menberetsehai Taddesse (2003) “Forgotten 
Provisions of the Criminal Justice Process” (title n Amharic) (A discussion paper 
presented at a workshop organised for Federal Judges, Prosecutors and Police). 
60  The Policy, Section 4.5.3. 
61  Id., Section 4.8.1.3.  
62  Id., Section 3.14. 
63  Id., Section 3.16.1. 
64  Id., Sections 4.6, 6.4.3. 
65  Id., Sections 3.5-3.10. 
66  Id., Section 3.17. These methods of investigation are adopted in the Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation No 652/2009. For instance, Art 14(1) provides that “in order to prevent 
and control terrorist acts, the National Intelligenc  and Security Service may,...:a) 
intercept or conduct surveillance on the telephone, fax, radio, internet, electronic, 
postal and similar communications of a person suspected of terrorism; b) enter into 
any premise in secret to enforce the interception; or c) install or remove instruments 
enabling the interception.” This power is also given to the police under Sub-art (4). 
The police are also authorized to conduct sudden and covert searches under Arts 16 
and 17, respectively. There is also authorised interception of correspondence and 
letters in corruption cases. Proc. No. 434/2005, Art 46. 
67  For in-depth examination of the problems relating to the gathering, preservation and 
returning of exhibits, see Mullualem Eneyew (2004) "The Gathering, Preservation 
and Return of Exhibits: International experience and the law and the practice in 
Ethiopia" (title in Amharic), a research paper presented to federal justice sector 
personnel Sodere: August 30- September 1. 
68  The Policy, Section 3.20. 
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In order to achieve these objectives, the policy anticipates capacity building 
of the personnel of the respective justice institutions,69 the adoption of new laws 
and the modification of the existing ones.70 Those laws and practices are 
supposed to conform to the Constitution and internatio l human rights 
conventions to which Ethiopia is a party.71 
One who reads those provisions would only assume that e policy 
anticipates improving the fairness of the criminal process. Notwithstanding this 
notable positive vision for the improvement of the criminal justice 
administration, the most serious predicament to fairness in the Policy, in relation 
to the theme of this article is shifting the burden of proof to the accused by 
providing for presumptions in serious criminal cases. Ironically, ‘The Reverse 
Onus of Proof’ is found under Part 4 titled “Improving the Effectiveness and 
Fairness of the Criminal Justice Process”.72   
2. Burden of Proof and/or the Presumption of Innocence 
2.1. Burden of Proof in General  
Burden of proof is the obligation of a party to a dispute to establish by evidence 
his assertion of facts by a required degree of certainty unless such fact is self-
evident. In this proposition, there are three distinct questions: what are the 
elements of burden of proof? which party has the obligation to prove a given 
fact? and what is the quantum of evidence or the standard of proof? In 
addressing these three questions we will see that the concept of burden of proof 
is one of the most deceptively simple in theory, but elusive in terms of 
application.73 
2.1.1. Elements of Burden of Proof 
Burden of proof has two elements: the burden of production sometimes referred 
to as evidentiary burden (or onus) and the burden of persuasion sometimes 
                                          
69  Id., Section 3.3  
70  Id., Part 7; also see the legislative requirements under i fra note 72. 
71  Id., at ii 
72  The last part of the Criminal Justice Administration Policy, i.e. Part 7 provides that 
existing legislation may be modified and new ones may be adopted to implement the 
Policy. Accordingly, there is a table prepared for the legislative requirements of the 
policy. <http://www.democraticdevelopment.ca/criminaljusticepolicy> 
73  Sometimes burden of proof is described as ‘slippery.’ C. B. Mueller and L. C. 
Kirkpatrick (2000) Evidence under the Rules: Texts, Cases and Problems 4th Ed., 
(New York: Aspen Law and Business), at 767. 
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referred to as legal burden (or burden).74 The burden of production is the 
obligation of a party to produce evidence in support of his assertion. The party 
who has the initial burden has the obligation to prduce evidence that is 
“cogent” or “compelling”.75 Where such party produces evidence, the other 
party does not have to disprove anything; however, h  automatically loses if he 
does not produce rebuttal evidence.76 The Indian Evidence Act (IEA), from 
which Ethiopia’s Draft Evidence Rule is borrowed, makes a distinction between 
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. Thus, regarding the 
burden of production, Section 102 provides that “[t]he burden of proof in a suit 
or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given 
on either side.” Regarding the legal burden, Section 101 provides that the party 
desiring “any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent 
on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist...” In 
civil matters, the burden of production may be shifted to the other party by 
presumptions.77 In any proceedings, the party who has the legal burden or the 
burden of persuasion has the obligation to convince the court that the evidence 
(presented by either party) supports the facts he is r lying on for his claim or 
defence. Such burden remains with the party on whom it is originally cast and 
cannot be shifted to the other party by any means including presumptions.78  
2.1.2. Allocation of the Burden of Proof 
Allocation of the burden of proof is allocation of risk between the parties 
because it is an ordinary rule of evidence that the party who has the burden of 
proof loses should he fail to discharge such burden. However, the party who 
asserts the affirmative of a fact has the burden of pr of. This basic rule for 
allocation of the burden of proof is uniformly applied both in civil as well as 
criminal matters.  
There are far more detailed specific provisions in c vil matters for the 
allocation of burden of proof based on these principles, both in the substantive 
and procedural codes, than in criminal matters. Thus, Article 896 of the 
Ethiopian Civil Code that deals with claims of entitlements under a will made 
by a deceased provides that “[w]hosoever claims rights under a will shall prove 
                                          
74  A. Singh (1998) Principles of the Law of Evidence 11th Ed., Central Law 
Publications, Allahbad, at 286; G. Dingwall (2002) "Statutory Exceptions, Burdens 
of Proof and the Human Rights Act 1998" Modern L. Rev., Limited, at 450, 51. 
75  Mueller and Kirkpatrick, supra note 73, at 769; R. C. Park, et. al., (1998) Evidence 
Law: A Student's Guide to the Law of Evidence as Applied in American Trials (St. 
Paul, Minn., West Group), at 93. 
76  Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Id., at 769. 
77  See for example FRE Rule 301, Infra note 144. 
78  Id. 
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the existence and the contents of such will”.79 Regarding a dispute on the 
(non)performance of a contract, the law provides that e party “who demands 
performance of an obligation shall prove its existence”.80 Otherwise, where the 
other party “alleges that [such] an obligation is void, has been varied or is 
extinguished, [he] shall prove the facts causing such nullity, variation or 
extinction”.81 These and similar provisions in the Civil Code and other 
substantive laws allocate the burden of proof in specific types of litigations. In 
civil litigation in general, Article 258 of the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code 
provides that the plaintiff has the burden of proof.  
Various issues of allocation of burden as between th  li igants arise based on 
the above stated principles. There are different formulations of the test for the 
allocation of such burden. Some state that the party who needs the assistance of 
the court has the obligation to prove because he is the one who is challenging 
the status quo.82 For example, Indian Evidence Act (IEA), Section 101, first 
alinea, provides that the party desiring “any Court to give judgment as to any 
legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must 
prove that those facts exist”.83 This test focuses on who brought the action. 
Accordingly, Article 258(1) of Ethiopia’s Civil Procedure Code provides that 
“...the plaintiff shall be entitled to begin...”84 In civil matters, It thus appears that 
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. This is in conformity with the principle 
that the party who brought the action should prove the facts in his claim.  
Almost all litigations have much more complex issues to be resolved. For the 
proper determination of the allocation of the burden of proof regarding each 
issue, there has to be another test. The better tes for the allocation of the burden 
of proof is based on who asserts the affirmative: the party who asserts the 
affirmative of an issue has the burden of proof because it is much easier to prove 
the affirmative than the negative.85 If P claims that he had a contract with D but 
the latter failed to discharge his contractual obligation, P has to prove that there 
was a contract to be performed. This may be done by producing the contract 
                                          
79  The manners of proof of a will are further provided for under Art 897. 
80  Civ. C., Art 2001(1). 
81  Id., Art 2001(2). 
82  Singh, supra note 74, at 286. 
83  IEA Section 101. Second alinea further provides that, "[w]hen a person is bound to 
prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person." 
84  The word ‘entitled’ is misleading because it appears to be the right of the party to 
begin his case. The word is also used in Civ. P. C., Art 259(1). Seen in light of other 
provisions, including Arts 137(1) the Amharic version, 223(1), 256(1) and 259(1), it 
is not an entitlement; it is rather the duty of a party to prove a particular fact the 
failure of which is sanctioned by losing the litigation on that specific issues. 
85  Singh, supra note 74, at 285; Mueller and Kirkpatrick, supra note 73, at 768. 
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document itself. However, this test further begs the question as to what assertion 
is. This rule is often misunderstood and misapplied convoluting the real problem 
with unrelated issues.86 
Certainly, the party who alleges that a contract exists is asserting the 
affirmative. Assertion of the affirmative needs careful interpretation beyond its 
grammatical form, and it is the substance of the assertion that needs to be seen. 
When a person, for example, alleges the non-performance of a contract, a 
negative action, the proponent is also asserting the affirmative of the fact that 
the respondent had a positive duty and by his inaction the proponent sustained 
damage.  
The third test which is much more specific to the burden of production of 
evidence but that can also at times be used for burden of proof in general is that 
the party who would lose the matter if evidence is not produced by either side 
has the burden of proof. It appears to be based on the test under  Section 102  of  
India’s Evidence Act which provides that “[t]he burden of proof in a suit or 
proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given 
on either side.” This test still does not answer all the questions regarding burden 
of proof; but it helps to a great extent by supplementing the previous two tests 
which are not significantly different from each other.  
These tests for the allocation of burden of proof are pplicable both in civil 
and in criminal matters.  However, it is to be noted hat in criminal matters, 
presumption of innocence is an important tool for the determination of the initial 
burden of proof. Although the constitutional principle of presumption of 
innocence generally allocates the burden of proof t the public prosecutor, the 
real allocation of the burden of proof is complicated regarding proof of each 
issue. Thus, when we use these tests for the allocation of the burden of proof, we 
have to use all of them at once, and we can allocate the burden of proof 
regarding a particular issue to either party only when we are positive about each 
test.  
2.2. Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof in 
Criminal Matters 
Presumption of innocence is not an ordinary presumption wherein the basic 
facts are proved and the presumed facts are taken as proved.87 Presumption of 
innocence is a restatement of the rule that the public prosecutor has the 
obligation to prove each element that constitutes th  crime beyond a reasonable 
                                          
86  Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Id., at 767; also, see Section 4, and i fra note 170. 
87  N. H. Holland and H. H. Chamberlin (1973) “Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Proof 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?” 7 Val. U. L. Rev. No. 2, at 147, 148; sometimes the 
principle of presumption of innocence is referred to as ‘assumption’. Id., at 148. 
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doubt.88  Article 20(3) of the Ethiopian Constitution stipulates that, “[d]uring 
proceedings, accused persons have the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law and not to be compelled to testify against 
themselves”.89 The accused on his part is not thus required to submit proof 
before the public prosecutor produces evidence.90  
The allocation of the initial burden of proof in criminal matters is obvious. 
Article 136(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that “...the public 
prosecutor shall open his case explaining shortly the charges he proposes to 
prove and the nature of the evidence he will lead...”91 This is further 
strengthened by the provisions of Articles 141 and 142. If, after the prosecution 
case is concluded, the court “finds that no case against the accused has been 
made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, [it] shall record an 
order of acquittal”.92 Conversely, where, after the prosecution evidence is 
concluded “the courts find that a case against the accused has been made out ... 
it shall call on the accused to enter upon his defence”.93  In entering his defence, 
“[t]he accused or his advocate may then open his case and shortly explain his 
defence stating the evidence he proposes to put forward...”94  
Unlike other principles, there is no exception/restriction to the principle of 
presumption of innocence.95 There is no general restriction on the right in the
                                          
88  There is no argument that exempts the state from the burden of proof. It is not only a 
matter of principle it is also a matter of common practice that the public prosecutor 
proves the charge he is marshalling against the accused. Singh, supra note 74, at 295. 
Further, although unstated, there is also a specific requirement that the facts need to 
be ‘properly proved.’ Properly proved means proof based on lawfully obtained, 
relevant, admissible and reliable evidence. Anderson, Schum and Twining, supra 
note 4, at 82; B. G. Joubert, S. Tarblanche and V. M. Van Rooney (1999) Criminal 
Procedure Handbook, Fourth Ed., (Kenwyn: Juta & Co.), p.6.  
89  FDRE Const. Art 20(3) 
90  Defendant is not required to participate in the proof process against himself; that is 
what is referred to as privilege against self-incrimination. J. D. Jackson (2005) "The 
Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, 
Divergence or Realignment?" 68 Modern L. Rev. No. 5, at 758 
91  Sub-arts (2) and (3) provide for oath/affirmation a d examination of prosecution 
witnesses which are further elaborated by the subsequent provisions, Arts 137, 139 
and 140. 
92  Art 141. 
93  Art 142(1). 
94  Art 142(2).  
95  The right to life may be restricted as “punishment for a serious criminal offence 
determined by law” (Art 15). The right to liberty may be restricted “on such grounds 
and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law” (Art 17). There 
are also restrictions to the right to privacy as are p ovided for under Art 26(3). 
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Constitution nor is there any specific restriction uder the provisions of the 
FDRE Constitution.96 Therefore, in light of the foregoing discussion, the public 
prosecutor has the obligation to prove all the elemnts constituting the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the accused to be convicted of such 
crime.  
These allocations of burden of proof by the law are not arbitrary decisions; 
they are all in conformity with the basic principle of allocation of burden of 
proof discussed above – the party who asserts the affirm tive shall prove the 
existence of such fact. Thus, in the criminal charge, the public prosecutor is 
asserting that the defendant has committed the crime contrary to the criminal 
law. Before the discussion on the issue of shifting he burden of proof to the 
defendant, therefore, it is appropriate to examine the facts that constitute the 
crime and other facts the prosecutor has to prove in his case.  
2.2.1. Elements Constituting the Crime and Other Facts that Need 
Proof 
Proof and the substantive criminal law are connected by the latter’s 
identification of the elements constituting the crime. A crime is an action (or 
omission) that is contrary to law97 and is deemed to be completed and 
punishable where “all its legal, material and moral ingredients are present”98 and 
“where the Court has found the crime proved and deserving of punishment.”99 
The legal element refers to the provisions of the criminal law that define 
whether a given action/omission is a crime. Such provisions state what facts 
constitute a crime the presence of which need to be proved. The identification of 
the elements constituting the crime is sometimes difficult and becomes a subject 
of heated argument in the court because all of those elements may not be 
provided for in the law (the relevant legal provision) that defines the crime. 
                                                                                                 
Although there is no restriction on the fr edom of religion, belief and opinion, there 
are necessary limitations on one's freedom to express or manifest his religion and 
belief (Art 27(5). Certainly, there are such necessary restrictions on the right of 
thought, opinion and expression (Art 29), and the right to assembly, demonstration 
and petition (Art 30). 
96  Article 20(3) of the FDRE Constitution. See the discussion on possible restriction 
of rights provided for in the Canadian and South African constitutions under Section 
3.2.1. below.  
97  Crim. C., Art 23(1). 
98  Id., Art 23(2); Jemila Mohammed Hagos, et. al., v Public Prosecutor (Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Division, Cass. F. No. 38161) Vol. 9, at 12. 
99  Crim. C., Art 23(4). 
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Thus, identification of the elements in such circumstances may require the judge 
(or the parties) to go beyond the statutory definitio .100  
The public prosecutor should also prove other facts that may not necessarily 
constitute the crime. Thus, apart from what the Criminal Code provides for, 
Article 111(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that “[e]very charge ... 
shall contain: (a) the name of the accused; and (b) the offence with which the 
accused is charged and its legal and material ingredients; and (c) the time and 
place of the offence and,101 where appropriate, the person against whom or the 
property in respect of which the offence was committed; and (d) the law and 
article of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed.” 
Article 112 further provides that “[e]ach charge shall describe the offence and 
its circumstances so as to enable the accused to know exactly what charge he 
has to answer [to]. Such description shall follow as closely as [possible] the 
words of the law creating the offence.” 
The moral element of crimes is defined under Articles 57 ff of the Criminal 
Code. Accordingly, a person is guilty of a crime “if, being responsible for his 
acts, he commits a crime either intentionally or by negligence”.102 An action is 
not punishable “if it was performed or occurred without there being any guilt” 
on the part of the actor “or was caused by force majeure, or occurred by 
accident”.103 Likewise, a person may not be convicted for “what e neither knew 
of or intended, nor for what goes beyond what he int nded either directly or as a 
possibility”.104  
Intention exists where a person commits “an unlawful and punishable act 
with full knowledge and intent in order to achieve a given result”105 or that “he, 
being aware that his act may cause illegal and punishable consequences, 
commits the act regardless of such consequences may follow”. 106 An intentional 
                                          
100  Some argue that the public prosecutor has to prove that defendant committed the 
crime without a justification and excuse. Thus, proof f lack of affirmative defence 
becomes an element of a crime because it ultimately ffects culpability. For instance, 
the court in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) goes beyond the statutory 
definition of the crime of murder to find absence of passion. L. E. Chiesa (2011) 
“When an Offense is Not an Offense: Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Reasonable 
Doubt Jurisprudence” 44 Creighton L. Rev., at 653, 675, 658 & 659. 
101  Place and time of the crime is also provided for under Crim. C., Art 26 making the 
subject matter one of substance rather than mere procedure. 
102  Id., Art 57(1) second alinea. 
103  Id., Art 57(2). 
104  Id., Art 58(3). 
105  Id., Art 58(1)(a). 
106  Id., Art 58(1)(b). 
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crime, in the absence of justifications and excuses, is always punishable.107  
However, once the elements constituting the crime are identified, each of them 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the pros cution.  
Sentencing comes after conviction; thus, the facts that are essential for the 
determination of sentence either by aggravation,108 mitigation or otherwise are 
proved by preponderance of the evidence.109 This is because those facts come 
after the presumption of innocence is effectively disproved.110 However, where 
the aggravation changes the article under which the def ndant is to be convicted 
or if it substantially increases the sentence, then t ose facts should be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt as they relate to culpability.111  
2.2.2. Standards of Proof of Facts Constituting the Crime 
Facts exist or do not exist; they do not exist in probabilities.112 Proof of facts is 
assessed in terms of conviction; convictions are expressed in term of degrees 
which is determined based on the quantum of evidence for the determination of 
the ultimate fact.113 Thus, proof of facts is assessed in terms of probabilities, 
e.g., the occurrence of a given fact is more or less probable than its non-
occurrence where the standard of proof is by preponderance of the evidence. 
The “highest degree of probability” is what is called “truth”.114 There is always 
a degree of doubt/uncertainty that is tolerated in proof because it cannot be 
avoided, although the degree of doubt that is tolerated in civil matters is much 
higher than that is tolerated in criminal matters. Therefore, it is commonly stated 
                                          
107  Id., Art 58(2). 
108  There are two different ways of looking at the elments of the crime that are relevant 
to our discussion: the first is violation of what is provided for by the legislature 
where the law comprehensively includes all the elemnts of the crime. The second is 
violation of the prohibitive norm and the absence of justification or excuse. Thus, 
depending on the nature of a particular crime, the public prosecutor has the burden 
of proving both the commission of a crime and where appropriate, the absence of 
justification or excuse. Chiesa, supra note 100, at 650, 651. 
109  Id., at 654, 657, 666. 
110  Id., at 654. 
111  Chiesa, supra note 100, at 649, 650. 
112  G. Postema (1983) “Fact, Fiction and the Law: Bentham on the Foundation of 
Evidence” in William Twining (ed.), Facts in Law 16 Archiv fur Rechts-und 
Sozialphilosophie, at 40. 
113  Id., at 41, 42 & 57; Park, et. al., supra note 75, at 88. 
114  Per Olof Ekelof (1964), "Free Evaluation of Evidenc " in 8 Scandinavian Studies in 
Law, at 51. Also see Postema, supra note 112, at 39, 44 
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that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in order for 
the defendant to be convicted.115  
According to the American common law understanding of standards of 
proof, there are three levels of proof.116 Proof in civil matters are not that strict; 
the most lenient degree of proof is by the preponderance of the evidence. In 
selected matters, where for policy reasons the legislature chooses a higher 
standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence is required. We seem to have 
these common law types of standards of proof. The standards of proof in judicial 
decisions is nowhere expressly stated in Ethiopia’s laws except in the Revised 
Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence regarding 
confiscation of property obtained as a result of corruption.117 A closer 
examination of the matter gives the impression that in such areas where there is 
no specific type of evidence required, as suggested by the Revised Anti-
Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation 
No.434/2005, a lesser standard of proof by preponderanc  of the evidence is 
good enough. 
In some instances, although the law does not specifically refer to the degree 
of proof, the substantive codes provide for specific modalities of proof. e.g., 
proof of ownership,118 proof of a will,119 and proof of filiation.120 Those types of 
evidence, by their very nature, have higher probative value and thus proof by 
such evidence is stricter than proof by preponderance of the evidence. The 
standard of proof in those instances can properly be referred to as clear and 
convincing evidence.  
                                          
115  In the United States the rule is established by the Supreme Court in re Winship 397 
U.S. 358 (1970). See further, Chiesa, upra note 100, at 649. In the United Kingdom 
and its former colonies, including India, the allocation of the burden of proof is 
established by the House of Lords in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecution 
(1935) A.C. 462.  
116  K. M. Clermont and E. Sherwin (2002) "A Comparative View of Standards of 
Proof" 50 Am. J. Comp. L., at 251-53. In the British system, however, there are only 
two standards of proof: proof by a balance of probabilities for civil matters and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal matters.  
117  Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation 
No.434/2005,  Art 33 provides that “[t]he standard of proof required to determine 
any question arising as to whether a person has benefited from criminal conduct, or 
the amount to be recovered shall be that applicable in civil proceedings” This 
provision was initially introduced in Proc. No 231/2001, Art 24.  
118  Civ. C., Arts 1193 – 1203. 
119  Id., Arts 896, 897. 
120  Fam. C., Arts 123 ff. 
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The standard of proof required in criminal matters is different from that 
required in civil matters. All the elements constituting the offence have to be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty.121 Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is a common law concept.122 The concept of ‘a 
reasonable doubt’ is nowhere intelligibly defined thus leaving the concept 
vague.123 The standard of proof in criminal matters is not established in our laws 
nor is it stated in the Federal Supreme Court Cassation D vision decisions that 
are binding interpretation of the law. However, there are indications that the 
standard of proof in criminal matters is much higher t an in civil matters.124 The 
courts in Ethiopia were applying the “beyond a reason ble doubt” standard of 
                                          
121  The standards of proving the elements of the crime s not uniform when such 
element of the crime is proved as an offence, as a defence or as an affirmative 
defence. The rule is all the elements constituting the crime have to be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt in order for a defendant to be convi ted of such crime. However, 
when a defendant raises it as a defence, he has to prove such fact by preponderance 
of the evidence in order to create reasonable doubt. Where the fact is raised as an 
affirmative defence, defendant has to prove that fac by preponderance of the 
evidence and the public prosecutor has to disprove it b yond a reasonable doubt. For 
in-depth analysis of the subject, see Chiesa, supra note 100. Also see infra note 140.  
122 In the United States, for instance, although the concept of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt has long standing history, it is crystallized in re: Winship and elevated to the 
level of a constitutional rule relatively recently. Underwood, supra note 6, at 1301; 
J. C. Sheldon, “Presumptions against Criminal Defendants, Affirmative Defenses, 
and a Substantive Due Process Interpretation of County Court of Ulster v. Allen” 34 
Maine L. Rev., at 306; Chiesa, supra note 100, at 649; Mueller and Kirkpatrick, 
supra note 73, at 801. The concept is reaffirmed by Mullaney v. Wilbur 343 U.S. 790 
(1952) and Patterson v. New York 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
123 See in general, R. D. Bartels (1981) “Punishment and the Burden of Proof in 
Criminal Cases: A Modest Proposal” 66 Iowa L. Rev.; Underwood, supra note 6, 
and Chiesa, supra note 100. 
124 Article 2149 of the Civil Code regarding tort claims resulting from a criminal action 
where a criminal case is filed in another court provides that “[i]n  deciding whether 
an offence has been committed, the court shall not be bound by an acquittal or 
discharge by a criminal court.” Likewise, where there is a civil claim joined to a 
criminal action, Article 158 of the Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that “[w]here 
the accused is acquitted or discharged, the court shall not adjudicate on the question 
of compensation and shall inform the injured party that he may file a claim against 
the accused in the civil court having jurisdiction.” These provisions do not directly 
state the standard of proof that is employed in civil and criminal trials; however, 
they give indications that the standard of proof in criminal matters is higher than that 
required in civil matters. The fact that the Civil Code is borrowed from the 
continental system and the Criminal Procedure Code is borrowed from the common 
law system indicates that the difference in the standards of proof in civil and 
criminal matters is universal.  
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proof in criminal matters which was presumably introduced by British judges 
and government advisors.125 It appears that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
principle has been taken to heart, and our judges w re consistently using the 
words when they enter judgment whether it is acquittal or conviction of 
defendant.126  
In the French system, including Germany, representatives of the civil law 
system, the degree of proof required to convict a defendant is “thorough 
conviction” or conviction intime of the judge. This standard does not prescribe 
rules that can be cited as a source on which “the fullness and sufficiency of a 
proof particularly depend” but rather requires of the judges “that they ask 
themselves, in silence and reflection to seek out, in the sincerity of their 
conscience, what impression the evidence reported against the accused and the 
ground of his defense have made on their reason”.127  
                                          
125  Buhagiar, a Maltese, and a British citizen was president of the High Court here in 
Ethiopia. His mentor and the one who brought him to Ethiopia, Sir Charles Matthew, 
also British and previously Chief Justice in Malta, was Ethiopian Government 
advisor at the Ministry of Justice since the second half of the 1950s. Trained and 
having had worked in the common law system, it is presumed that they introduced 
the principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. Buhagiar, 
William <www.maltamigration.com> (last accessed 26 August 2009). 
126  In recent years, there are judgments which state that that the defendant “has (not) 
disproved the prosecution evidence.” This effectively eliminates the meaning of “a 
reasonable doubt.” It is not clear whether the judges use this phrase in their ruling 
either because of gaps in reasoning and poor evaluation of the evidence or 
indifference to the concepts of a reasonable doubt and the degree of proof that is 
expected of the defendant. At times, court records show that the judge does not even 
properly evaluate the prosecution evidence when entering a ruling based on Article 
141 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In some recent d cisions there is no mention of 
(beyond) a reasonable doubt in writing judgment. There is not even consistent use of 
the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt.” There are all sorts of phrases for the 
concept. Worku Yaze, supra note 59, at 133, 134 note 37. 
127  Article 353 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides the following:  
“[b]efore an assize court [the court trying felony cases] retires, the president shall 
read the following instructions, which, in addition, shall be posted on large letters in 
the most prominent place in the conference room:  
The law does not ask an accounting from judges of gr unds by which they 
became convinced; it does not prescribe for them rules on which they must 
make the fullness and sufficiency of a proof particularly depend; it requires of 
them that they ask themselves, in silence and reflection to seek out, in the 
sincerity of their conscience, what impression the evidence reported against the 
accused and the ground of his defense have made on their reason. The law asks 
them only the single question, which encompasses th full measure of their 
duties: ‘Are you thoroughly convinced?’ ”  
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A certain degree of proof is required only to create n equivalent degree of 
moral certainty in order to reach a certain conclusion regarding a material fact. 
The degree of one's conviction or moral certainty cannot be measured. The lack 
of such measurement, makes a rational discussion almost impossible on whether 
a common law jury is better convinced when a fact is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt or a civil law judge is better convinced when the facts are 
proved to conviction intime of the judge. It is certain that both concepts of 
standards of proof serve the respective society and it is believed that both have 
achieved their respective purposes.128 It is cogently argued by comparative 
lawyers that in criminal matters, the civil law conviction intime and the common 
law beyond a reasonable doubt standards of proof are equivalent.129  
Although there are no proper and rational distinctions to be made between 
the common law concept of beyond a reasonable doubt and the civil system 
concept of conviction intime, regarding the degree of conviction in the mind of 
the trier of fact, our courts need to continue using the common law ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ standard of proof in criminal matters for the following 
reasons.130 First, Ethiopian courts have been using beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of proof for a long time and all practitioners appear to have taken it as 
the norm thereby rendering its continued use much easier than the civil law 
conviction intime. Second, beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prof appears 
to be much more intelligible than the conviction intime because it is seen in the 
context of the other two standards of proof – preponderance of the evidence and 
clear and convincing evidence. Third, related to the foregoing two reasons, 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is much less susceptible to abuse 
than conviction intime. Fourth, both the Criminal Procedure and the Civil 
Procedure Codes are borrowed from the adversarial systems, and the use of 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is onlya matter of consistency. 
Finally, the general background of the working situation of the two standards of 
proof, the training of the judges in the respective systems and integration of the 
work of the police and the prosecution office is different in systems that have 
                                                                                                 
Also see, in general, Clermont and Sherwin, supra note 116. 
128  Different legal traditions may have different processes. However, human rights 
conventions and procedures have the effect that the systems have a more or less 
common standard of process across legal systems. Jackson, supra note 90, at 739. 
129  Clermont and Sherwin, supra note 116, at 245, 246. 
130  A proper and serious comparative examination of both concepts indicates that there 
is no distinction between the common law beyond a reasonable doubt standard and 
the civil law conviction intime. The unifying factor is the individual right to 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty which requires a higher standard of 
proof. Although the concept has not brought about cnvergence of the two systems' 
procedures of proof neither system's fair process is uperior to the other. Jackson, 
supra note 90, at 757, 764; Clermont and Sherwin, supra note 116, at 245, 246 
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beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof and those that have conviction 
intime. In this regard, the administration of our criminal justice is much tuned to 
the common law system, and our judges have yet to have suitable training and a 
different working experience to handle conviction intime and make a proper 
distinction between conviction intime in civil and criminal matters.131  
Thus, the public prosecutor in Ethiopia has to prove all the elements 
constituting the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Elements of the crime include 
not only the violation of the law prohibiting the act or omission, but it may also 
include absence of justification or excuse.132 Further, where the fact is an 
aggravating circumstance constituting an element of he crime, it has to be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.133 Such is the case where, because of 
aggravation, the provision under which the accused is to be convicted is 
changed even though he is not originally charged under that Article.  
3. Burden of Proof Borne by the Defendant 
3.1. Affirmative Defences  
The initial burden of proof that the state bears to pr ve all the ingredients of a 
crime beyond reasonable doubt (in order for defendant to be convicted) may 
appear to be shifted to the defendant only in two circumstances. They ar  where 
the defendant raises affirmative defences and where t  law allows an ingredient 
of a crime to be proved by presumptions. Although the main focus of this article 
is presumptions, a few words may be appropriate about affirmative defences, a 
tool by which the burden of proof is said to be shifted to the defendant.134  
In the General Part of the Criminal Code, there are justifications and excuses 
which may fully or partly exempt defendant from criminal liability.135 When a 
defendant raises any of these affirmative defences, h  is not denying the facts; 
the defendant rather affirms the action or omission asserted by the prosecution, 
                                          
131  In the civil law system, both in France and Germany, the standard of proof required 
in civil matters and criminal matters is conviction intime. Clermont and Sherwin, Id., 
at 245-47, 250. It is alluded earlier that the standards of civil and criminal matters is 
different. Thus, while using the same standard, making different application is quite 
a task.  
132  G. C. Christie and A. K. Pye (1970) “Presumptions a d Assumptions in Criminal 
Law: Another View” Duke L. J., at 935, 936). 
133  Chiesa, supra note 100, at 654. 
134  Some even consider shifting both elements of burden of proof amount to affirmative 
defences. Sheldon, supra note 122, at 291, 292. 
135  Some of the justifications and excuses include, absolute coercion (Art 71), superior 




THE PRINCIPLE OF PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND ITS CHALLENGES IN THE  ETHN CR. PROCESS       297 
 
but invokes justifications or excuses against criminal liability. This involves 
alleging the presence of other facts that do not form part of the prosecution’s 
assertions. In affirmative defences, because the defen ant is asserting new facts, 
the burden of proving those new facts is on him. This is perfectly in line with 
the principles discussed above for allocation of the burden of proof as between 
the litigants.136 A defendant, however, by his affirmation of the facts alleged by 
the public prosecutor, waives the burden of proof borne by the public prosecutor 
regarding the facts constituting the crime. Affirmative defences do not actually 
shift the burden of proof because they do not constitute exceptions to the 
prosecutor’s duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.137 
Some legal systems have the rule that defendants have to prove justifications 
or excuses by the preponderance of the evidence while the public prosecutor 
may disprove such justification or excuse beyond reasonable doubt.138 This is 
not, however, compatible with Ethiopia’s laws. Neverth less, as guilt (as 
discussed in the preceding section) must be proved by the public prosecutor 
beyond a reasonable doubt for a criminal conviction, it is sufficient for 
defendant to create a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case.   
3.2. Presumptions 
Presumptions are not rules of evidence; they are procedural rules that define the 
relationship between two facts - the basic facts and the presumed fact.139 The 
relationship is that, a presumed fact is deemed proved until proven otherwise by 
the other party if the party in whose favour the prsumption operates proves the 
basic facts by a required degree. The degree of this relationship between those 
facts differs in different circumstances. The minimu  requirement is that there 
has to be a rational/logical relationship between the basic facts and the presumed 
facts.140 For instance, in the case of the issue of paternity, where a man lives 
                                          
136  See the discussion on the allocation of burden of pr of 2.1.1 above. Also see 
Underwood, supra note 6, at 1303, 04 including note 11 thereunder.  
137  IEA, Sec 105. 
138  This is the case in the United States, for example. Chiesa, supra note 100, at 657. 
139  P. C. Giannelli (2003), Understanding Evidence (New York: Matthew Bender and 
Co.), at 54 
140  Regarding presumptions in civil matters, it is necessary to see if there is a rational 
connection between the operative facts and the presum d facts, and whether the 
connection is good enough. See Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R. R. Co. v. 
Turnipseed 219 U.S. 35 (1910) (Holland and Chamberlin, n 88 above, at 162). The 
degree of the relationship between the basic facts and the presumed facts range from 
a rational one, when it is permissive presumption, t  one of beyond a reasonable 
doubt, in mandatory criminal presumptions. Sheldon, supra note 122, at 279, 
283,284. When the mandatory statutory presumptions were initially introduced, the 
requirement was that there be a rational connection between the operative facts and 
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with a woman in wedlock and a child is born after 180th day after the marriage 
and before the 300th day after divorce, the paternity of the man is presumed.141 
There is a logical connection between the facts of the man's living with the 
woman in wedlock for a specified time and the issue of paternity to a child born 
during the marriage. Likewise, where there is a house rental agreement in which 
“A” pays a sum of money to “B” on a monthly basis, a receipt issued by “B” for 
the month of September leads to the presumption that the payments for the prior 
months are paid.142 There is certainly a rational connection between the receipt 
for the month of September and the issue of payment for the previous months 
because they are similar transactions emanating from the same legal obligation.  
There are two types of presumptions: rebuttable and irrebuttable 
presumptions. In rebuttable presumptions, once the party in whose favour the 
presumption operates proves the basic facts, the otr party may produce 
evidence in order to disprove such presumption. Theeff ct of (rebuttable) 
presumption is that, it shifts the burden of proof to the other party against whom 
such presumption operates. However, it is only the burden of production that is 
shifted. In the common law system, where evidence on the issue has not been 
produced, such non-production of evidence generally exposes a party to an 
adverse result or a directed verdict.143 The burden of persuasion remains with 
the party on whom it is originally cast.144 
                                                                                                 
the presumed fact. However, when such presumption affects presumption of 
innocence such relationship is required to be one of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Christie and Pye, supra note 132, at 923, 924. For the progressive modificat on of 
this standard by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Holland and Chamberlin, supra note 
87, at 154-159.  
141  Fam. C., Arts 126, 128. 
142  Civ. C., Art 2022.  
143  Directed verdict is a verdict by the judge on matters of fact without presenting the 
issue of facts to the jury. As Ethiopia does not have  jury system there is no directed 
verdict. However, the decision to be entered as per Civ. Pro. C., Art 256 is 
equivalent to this concept of directed verdict. It provides that “[w]here evidence 
which should have been produced in accordance with Ar . 137 or 249 is not so 
produced due to the default of either party, the court may at once pronounce 
judgment ...” 
144  Regarding presumption in civil actions and proceedings, U.S. Federal Rule of 
Evidence (FRE) Rule 301 provides that “[i]n all civil actions and proceedings not 
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes 
on the other party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with 
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but doesn t hift to such part the burden 
of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion, which remains throughout the 
trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.” Also, see G. Weissenberger 
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In irrebuttable presumption, once the presumption is established the other 
party is precluded from disproving such presumption. Such rules are not in the 
realm of evidence law; they are rules of substantive law.145 There are social 
policy justifications for the application of presumptions, both rebuttable and 
irrebuttable, in civil matters.146 There appears to be limited application of 
rebuttable presumptions in criminal matters; however, to the knowledge of this 
author, there is no irrebuttable presumption that operates in criminal matters in 
any other legal system.  
3.2.1. Presumptions in Criminal Matters 
It is an essential manifestation of the principle of presumption of innocence that 
the state has to prove all the elements constituting he offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order for defendant to be convited.147 In several legal 
systems, there is no exception to this principle. For instance, in Re Winship148 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the public prosecutor has to prove all the 
ingredients constituting the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It appears there is 
no meaningful exception to this rule. In criminal matters, the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                 
(1995) FEDERAL EVIDENCE: 1996 Courtroom Manual (Cinci nati: Anderson 
Publishing Co.) at 29. 
145  Giannelli, supra note 139, at 53. 
146  Those policy justifications in using presumptions for proof of facts in civil matters 
may be seen in the area of presumption of absence, presumption of paternity and 
presumption of payment. They are all designed to address social problems to make 
life easy for those affected by the event. The application of such presumption is 
between the parties which are deemed to have equality of arms and the effect, if 
there is such negative effect, is only on the property rights or status of the parties.  
147  When a fact is to be proved, it has to be proved in any of the modalities of proof; 
customarily, there are oral evidence (testimony), documentary evidence and exhibits. 
Presumptions, although referred to as modalities of pr of under Civ. C., Arts 2002 
and 2003, in their application in criminal matters, presumptions are exemptions of 
proof. Proof is an affirmative showing of the existence or inexistence of a fact. 
Furthermore, presumptions are different from inferences in that they are legislative 
decisions of mandatory inferences; inferences are left to the discretion of the judge 
to make his own findings based on his experience and knowledge regarding the 
relationship between the different categories of facts.  
148  Beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is not a constitutional principle; 
however, the presumption of innocence is crystallized in and is elevated to a 
constitutional right level in Re Winship by the U.S. Supreme Court. See supra note 
122. Thus, if presumption of innocence is given a constitutional stature, it follows 
that the other side of the subject, a reasonable doubt, should also be afforded equal 
treatment because the two are inseparably intertwined. Holland and Chamberlin, 
supra note 87, at 149. 
 
 
300                                        MIZAN LAW REVIEW                             Vol. 6 No.2, December 2012 
     
Court held that only permissive statutory presumptions are constitutional.149 
Where there is mandatory statutory presumption, theprosecutor must 
“demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the presum d fact may be inferred 
from the proved fact or facts”150 thereby rendering them useless to the 
prosecution. Thus, the prosecution cannot rely merely on the inference as a “sole 
and sufficient basis for finding” of the presumed fact; it must also be shown that 
such inference actually works “as a matter of objectiv  fact”.151 
In few legal systems, presumption of the existence of an element constituting 
a crime is considered to be an exception to the above stated rule. For instance, in 
the United Kingdom, in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions it is 
held that statutory provisions that shift burden of proof to the defendant by 
presumption are to be regarded as exceptions to this rule.152  Such parliamentary 
acts authorising proof of elements constituting the crime by presumption are 
usually related to intention or knowledge. The validity of such legislation is 
tested based on the 1998 Human Rights Act (which is adopted in order to enable 
the UK discharge its treaty obligations) and Article 6(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which provides that “[e]veryone charged 
with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent u til proved guilty 
according to law.” 
The 1971 Misuse of Drug Act does not require the Prosecution Services to 
prove knowledge of the content of the substance in order to prove possession if 
a defendant was proved to be in control of such substance; it rather places the 
burden on the defendant to prove that he does not have such knowledge of the 
content of the substance.153  The validity of the manner of proof of knowledge in 
this legislation was tested against UK's treaty obligation under ECHR. Although 
the provisions of Article 6(2) are stated in absolute terms, the European Human 
Rights Court's jurisprudence (Salabiaku v France) indicates that, it does not 
                                          
149  Holland and Chamberlin, Id., at 153. 
150  The U.S. Supreme Court in the Ulster case severely restricted the application of 
mandatory presumptions that it made it “practically useless to the prosecution.” 
Sheldon, supra note 122, at 278, 279, 287, 288 
151  Id., at 278, 279, 287, 288. Statutory criminal presumption some opine, must be 
regarded as ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary’ …if there is a reasonable doubt as to the 
inference of the presumed fact from proof of the oprative facts on which it is made 
to depend. Holland and Chamberlin, supra note 87, at 166. When prosecution is 
proving a fact by presumption, the presumed fact should not receive less evidentiary 
treatment than other facts constituting the crime. Id., at 163. Statutory presumptions 
are manifestations that the legislature has less concern for reasonable doubt standard 
and presumption of innocence. Ibid, at 151. 
152  (1935) A.C. 462; Dingwall, supra note 74, at 450. 
153  Id., at 457. 
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prohibit presumption of law or fact. It only “requires states to confine 
them[selves] within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of 
what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defnce”.154 Therefore, the House 
of Lords held that the convention does not prohibit shifting the legal or 
evidential burden to the accused.155  
The court, however, made a distinction between the legal burden and the 
evidential burden. Shifting the evidentiary burden to the defendant is held to be 
not contrary to UK’s treaty obligation. Regarding the legal burden, the court 
adopted two stages of analysis: validity of governme t objective and 
proportionality of the measure. It was held by majority that imposing the legal 
burden on the defendant is a disproportionate response to any public 
objective.156  
Likewise, Article 11(d) of the Canada Charter of Rights and Freedom 
provides for presumption of innocence. The provision  f Article 1 make it clear 
that this right is subjected to “... such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic so iety.” Under the Drug 
Control Act, which is substantially identical to the UK's 1971 Misuse of Drug 
Act, David Edwin Oakes was charged with possession of hashish oil for the 
purposes of trafficking.  He was found in possession (control) of the substance 
with the presumed knowledge of the content of the substance. The accused 
challenged Section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act on the basis that it violated 
Article 11(d) of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada adopted the test 
whether there is “pressing and substantial” governmt objective to warrant 
overriding a constitutionally protected right that may be upheld under Article 11 
of the Charter; and if so, whether the means (shifting he burden of proof to 
defendant) is proper. The Court finally struck down the rule on the ground that it 
violates defendant's right to presumption of innocence.157   
The South African Constitution, very much influenced by the Canadian 
Charter, has detailed provisions regarding the limitation of the rights enshrined 
in the Constitution. Thus, Section 36 (1) provides:  
 [t]he rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including- 
a) the nature of the rights; 
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
                                          
154  Id., at 453. 
155  Id., at 453. 
156  Id., at 460, 46. 
157  R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
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d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.158  
Such shifting of the burden of proof to defendant may be constitutional for 
systems like the UK where acts of parliament are not subsidiary to a written 
constitution 159 or South Africa and Canada where there is a constitutional 
provision for limited authorisation of restriction of rights within the bounds of 
such authorisation.  
Ethiopia has, however, adopted a constitution which incorporates and 
entrenches the principle of the presumption of innocence of the accused until 
proven guilty before an independent, competent and impartial court. As 
discussed above, the Criminal and the Procedure Codes require that ‘intention’ 
as an element of a crime needs to be proved separatly as a fact constituting an 
element of such crime.160 Despite such constitutional provisions, however, 
Ethiopia has adopted laws which provide for proof of intention or knowledge by 
presumption in several and diverse types of crimes.   
There is even an irrebuttable presumption regarding such intention or 
knowledge that constitutes an element of the crime. Thus, with regard to crimes 
committed through the mass media, the Criminal Code provides that “[i]n 
determining the liability of a person ... for the crime committed through the 
product of mass media, the content of the matter shall be deemed to have been 
inserted, published or disseminated with ... full knowledge and consent” of the 
editor-in-chief, deputy editor, publisher, printer, disseminator, etc.161 [Emphasis 
added].  It is further provided that “[n]o proof to the contrary may be admitted in 
                                          
158  For further discussion on limitations on rights in the South African Bill of Rights see 
J. De Wall, I. Currie and G. Erasmus (2001) The Bill of Rights Handbook, Fourth 
Ed., (Lansdowne: Juta & Co.) Chapter Seven, at 144 ff. 
159  In the UK system, as there is no written constitution; the parliament is supreme. 
Thus, such liberal restriction of rights by acts of the parliament cannot be 
unconstitutional. In systems where there is constitutional supremacy, such as ours, 
that is not the case. Every subsidiary legislation needs to conform with the formal 
and substantive requirements of the Constitution. Where there is legislation with a 
provision which is contrary to those constitutional provisions, certainly, those 
provisions of the subsidiary legislation would be of n  effect.  
160  Certainly, proving a state of mind is a difficult task for the prosecution. Confession 
is the best proof there is. Sometimes, confession is not even considered proof; it is 
considered as a waiver of proof rather than a proof. H wever, state of mind is also 
proved by circumstantial evidence; such relevant fac s re motive, preparation for 
the commission of a crime, or premeditation. 
161  Crim. C., Art 43(5). Under this provision the fact that there was no knowledge and 
consent of the accused regarding the content inserted o  disseminated is not defence; 
it would only be the absence of the content from such media outlet.   
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such a case”.162 These are not evidentiary provisions; they are substantive 
provisions which establish guilt by presumption because they preclude contrary 
proof.163 Such presumptions are contrary to the principles of presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty; the public prosecutor is excused from proving 
those facts that are deemed to exist. Such presumptions are also contrary to the 
constitutional “right to adduce or to have evidence produced in their own 
defence, and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their 
behalf before the court”.164   
3.2.2. Rebuttable presumption  
It is in the nature of the crime of corruption that state of mind should be proved 
separately as an essential element constituting the crime. Proof of the elements 
constituting the crime of corruption by presumption appears to be introduced by 
the Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation No. 
236/2001, Art 24. Such presumption is incorporated into the Criminal Code in 
broader form. Thus, there are presumptions regarding elements of crimes of 
corruption both for specific corruption offences as well as general/blanket 
presumptions for certain categories of corruption crimes. 
a) Presumptions regarding specific crimes  
Article 419(1) of the Criminal Code provides that a certain property is deemed 
to have been obtained by corrupt practices and such person is punishable where 
the public prosecutor proves that a person in a public office:  
a) maintains a standard of living above that which is commensurate 
with the official income from his present or past employment or 
other means; or  
b) is in control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to 
the official income from his present or past employment or other 
means ... unless he gives a satisfactory explanation to the Court as to 
how he was able to maintain such a standard of living or how such 
pecuniary resources or property came under his control.  
There are also presumptions that affect persons that are related to the accused. It 
is provided that: 
                                          
162  Id. 
163  A provision which is equivalent to the presumption of guilt is a stark contrast to the 
protection of freedom of expression enshrined in the Constitution. It is almost a 
presumption of guilt because the basic fact that is required to be proved is the mere 
content of the media product “inserted, published or isseminated.” 
164  FDRE Const., Art 20(4). 
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[where the Court] is satisfied that there is reason to believe that any 
person, owing to his closeness to the accused or other circumstances, 
was holding pecuniary resource or property in trust for or otherwise on 
behalf of the accused, such resources, or property shall, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, be presumed to have been under the control of 
the accused.165  
These provisions establish and define the crime of c rruption. In these 
provisions, presumptions of the facts constituting the crime are the bedrock of 
the crime of corruption. It is only by disproving these presumptions that a 
defendant may be acquitted from the charge of the crime of corruption.    
b) General/blanket presumptions  
The Criminal Code has introduced a general/blanket prsumption of state of 
mind for those offences considered to be corruption. Thus, in any ‘action’ that is 
considered as a corrupt practice, the essential element of the crime, state of 
mind, is deemed to exist where other facts are proved. Article 360 of the 
Criminal Code provides that “[i]n respect of the crimes specified under Articles 
356-359, the acts shall be presumed to have been done with the intent to utter.” 
It is not clear whether this presumption is rebuttable or irrebuttable. However, it 
can be argued that because contrary proof is not expressly precluded and 
precluding such contrary proof would be contrary to the provisions of FDRE 
Const., Art 20(4), the right of defendant to present evidence in his defence, such 
presumption is rebuttable presumption. Another example of general or blanket 
presumption is embodied in Article 403 of the Criminal Code titled 
‘Presumption of Intent to Obtain Advantage or to Injure”.  The provision 
stipulates the following: 
Unless evidence is produced to the contrary, where it is proved that the 
material element [the act] has been committed as defined in a particular 
Article providing for a crime of corruption perpetrated to obtain or 
procure undue advantage or to cause injury, such act shall be presumed 
to have been committed with intent to obtain for oneself or to procure 
for another an undue advantage or to injure the right or interest of a third 
person.  
The provisions that follow Article 403 of the Criminal Code list the various 
categories of corruption offences. As is evident from the provisions, this 
presumption is rebuttable and the defendant may produce contrary evidence. 
However, disproving a presumed state of mind is more difficult than proving it. 
Thus, the burden on defendant is unreasonable.   
                                          
165  Id., Art 419(2) 
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3.2.3. The kind of presumptions contemplated in the Policy 
The Criminal Justice Administration Policy states that when certain basic facts 
are proved by the public prosecutor, the court shall presume the existence of 
certain other facts. It is, therefore, up to the defendant to disprove such 
presumption.166 This is also referred to in the various papers presented for 
implementation of the Policy.167 The presumption regarding the media is taken 
directly from the 1957 Penal Code, adopted four deca s before the current 
Ethiopian Constitution, with minor modifications. The presumptions regarding 
the crimes of corruption are incorporated into the Criminal Code from 
Proclamation No 231/2001 without substantial modification, other than the 
minor change to give them a broader application for all crimes related to 
corruption. Therefore, it is hardly possible to expct a milder content or 
application of presumptions as contemplated by the Policy.  
One might wonder whether the burden of proof contemplated to be shifted to 
the defendant is legal burden or evidential one. This question is legitimate in 
view of the words used in the papers presented for implementation of the Policy. 
As the papers are written in English they use the terms “reverse onus of 
proof”.168 If we have to take the literal meaning of the terms, reversing the onus 
of proof is only shifting the evidential burden or the burden of production. It is 
hardly possible to take such terms literally and assume that they are used to 
mean what they actually connote. They are rather loosely used to mean shifting 
both the legal and evidential burden to defendant because, this distinction does 
not seem to be appreciated at all in the practice of various courts nor are defence 
counsels raising such arguments.  
Therefore, such distinction, in Ethiopia’s legal system, appears to be without 
effect. Further, even if it is understood and appreciat d, there is no significant 
practical distinction between the legal and evidential burden. If a defendant is 
able to produce evidence it is only a little more effort to prove the facts 
operating in his favour. Therefore, the kind of presumption contemplated by the 
newly adopted Policy is not expected to be different from what is already in 
application – shifting both the legal and evidential burden to the defendant 
regarding the elements constituting a crime, usually intention or knowledge. 
                                          
166  The Policy, Section 4.4. 
167  There were about six papers for the implementation of the Criminal Justice 
Administration Policy. Only two of them are relevant to this subject where there is a 
specific mention of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in few selected 
serious crimes: 1) Criminal Justice Administration Policy – Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia: Elements of an Implementation Plan, at 22; and 2) Preliminary 
Analysis of the Legislation Requirements of the Criminal Justice Administration 
Policy, at 11; See supra note 72. 
168  Id. 
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However, what cannot be stated for sure is whether  operation of the 
presumption will also be extended to other material facts or whether they will be 
limited to knowledge or intention.  
4. Burden of Proof in Alleged Coercion during Police 
Interrogation 
The police routinely interrogate suspects as part of the investigation process as 
per Article 27(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. A major problem regarding 
burden of proof in criminal matters is that of proof relating to coercion during 
alleged confession of a defendant.  
The interrogation of the defendant is not the main source of proof to establish 
crime.  A case in point is trial in absentia. However, after having taught the law 
on criminal procedure and evidence for several years, this author has never 
encountered a court case which states that a defendant has opted not to give a 
statement to the police by exercising an accused person’s constitutional right to 
remain silent.169 Stated otherwise, the suspect (the arrested person) always gives 
a written statement regarding the commission of the crime. In not few cases, the 
suspect confesses to the commission of the crime for various reasons. However, 
the public prosecutor produces the confession as the ‘best’ evidence on the 
matter. Often, the defendant contends that he had confessed to the crime on 
coercion and it should not be admissible as evidence against him.  
In the ideal scenario, as laying the foundation of the evidence, the public 
prosecutor has to prove that such confession is obtained in conformity with the 
Constitution. In such cases, however, the courts wrongly shift the burden of 
proof to the accused. The usual erroneous judicial reasoning is that because the 
defendant asserts the affirmative about police misconduct during investigation, 
he has to prove his assertion.  In some cases, the conf ssion is relevant not only 
for its content but also for other evidence gathered based on the confession, 
commonly referred to as fruits of a poisonous tree. Unfortunately, the burden of 
proof in alleged confession cases is convoluted with other unrelated matters. 
This is particularly so when courts fail to properly f ame the issue.  
In police misconduct cases, the defendant challenges propriety by contending 
that the evidence is unlawfully obtained thereby submitting that it should not be 
admitted into evidence. The courts on the other hand, frame the issue from the 
                                          
169  The accused appearing before the investigating police fficer (whether on summons 
or by a compulsory process) may deny or admit the commission of the crime. The 
third possibility can be opting to keep silent. The author has not seen a police 
investigation report submitted to the public prosecutor stating that the suspect is 
present and he, exercising his constitutional right, has refused to give statements.  
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perspective of veracity and, in effect, proceed to examine whether such 
confession is reliable evidence in the matter.170 Thus, even in cases where 
defendant proves coercion, such courts often reason that, the confession is 
supported by and is in conformity with other evidenc  and is therefore 
reliable.171  
The issue in the alleged confession case is whether such confession is 
obtained lawfully. In view of the above test for allocation of the burden of proof, 
it is the public prosecutor who has the burden of pr ving that the confession was 
obtained lawfully. That is because the public prosecutor is asserting the 
affirmative and thus has to prove that the confession is obtained in conformity 
with the Constitution and other provisions of the law.172  
In whatever form the confession of a defendant is presented to a court, it is 
usually presented as documentary evidence. It is, however, arguable whether it 
is documentary evidence. The public prosecutor submits it to court under the 
expectation that it is obtained in accordance with the law, and this constitutes its 
foundation. For the defendant, however, it is good enough if he states that the 
confession is obtained contrary to law. Such is the case when a person disclaims 
                                          
170  In Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission v. Tamir t Layine, et al., 
defendant alleged that he gave incriminating statements to the police after he has 
been psychologically coerced by the latter. The Federal Supreme Court held that 
"the confession is supported by other evidence and it cannot be said unreliable." 
(Federal Supreme Court, 2000, Crim. F. No. 1/89). In Tesfaye Engdayehu v. Public 
Prosecutor, defendant proved he was tortured by the police. The court, however, 
held that his confessions are consistent with other evidence and are thus reliable 
(Supreme Court Circuit Bench, Cr. App. File No. 162/Wollo/74). Likewise, in Ali 
Dugadibo v. Public Prosecutor defendant claimed police misconduct (Supreme 
Court Circuit Bench, Cr. App. File No. 171/75). The court framed almost the same 
issue and arrived at the same conclusion as above. However, the court acquitted 
defendant not because of the proof of allegation of police misconduct but because 
the confession is the only evidence and there is a contradiction between the 
confession given to the police during investigation and the confession given to the 
Woreda Court at the preliminary inquiry. 
171  Id. 
172  Before a documentary evidence or a real evidence is admitted, it must be proved that 
the evidence is what it is purported to be. This is what is called laying the 
foundation. Park, et. al., supra note 75, at 501 ff. Laying the foundation, however, 
has a wider application than authentication. For insta ce, before a secondary 
evidence is admitted, the proponent must prove the primary evidence is lost (E.g., 
Civ. C., Art. 2003). Authentication and laying the foundation are preconditions to 
the admissibility of an item of evidence. G. Weissenb rger, Federal Evidence: 1996 
Courtroom Manual (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co.), at 244; also see FRE rule 
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his alleged handwriting or signature in a non-authenticated document (Civ. C., 
Art 2007(1)) or where heirs “declare that they do not recognize the writing or 
signature of their ascendant” who is deceased. (Civ. ., Art 2007(2)). Likewise, 
Section 104 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that “[t]he burden of proving 
any fact necessary to be proved in order to enable ny person to give evidence 
of any other fact is on the person who wishes to give such evidence.” 
There are also other reasons why the public prosecutor has the burden of 
proof of propriety in confession cases. First, the public prosecutor has a 
constitutional duty to see to it that the rights of the suspect under Chapter Three 
of the Constitution are respected and enforced.173 Among various fundamental 
rights, the suspect is entitled to the protection against any form of cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment174 and the presumption of innocence.175 Thus, 
when the public prosecutor presents the alleged confession as evidence against 
the defendant, he is also asserting the affirmative that, the confession is obtained 
respecting the constitutional rights of the suspect/ac used and that the public 
prosecutor has discharged its constitutional duties to enforce and protect those 
rights.  
Second, a distinction should be made between statements made to the police 
(under Article 27(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code) as extra-judicial 
admissions or evidential admissions176 and the judicial admissions that are made 
before the court (based on Articles 35, 132, etc of the Criminal Procedure 
Code). As the court judicially notices the fact of making the latter admissions 
and their contents, judicial admissions need not be proved. Extra-judicial 
admissions are, on the other hand, made outside the court, to whomever they are 
made. In such instances, the facts stated in such confession and their content 
must be proved to the court.177 One such confession is the one made to the 
police based on Crim. P. C., Art 27(2). This is called aying the foundation 
before evidence is admitted. 
Furthermore, it is the state that chooses the place, time and setting for 
investigation and interrogation. Defendant has very little choice, if any, during 
interrogation. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to prove that he 
was coerced while being interrogated by the police. Where the state makes it 
                                          
173  FDRE Const., Art 13(1). 
174  Art 18. 
175  Art 20(3). 
176  Giannelli, supra note 139, at 434, 435. 
177  There are two aspects of challenge to extra-judicial admissions: the hearsay aspect 
and the constitutionality aspect. What is relevant here is the constitutionality aspect 
of the challenge.  
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difficult for the individual to prove propriety during confession, then it is on the 
public prosecutor to prove that the confession is obtained lawfully.178   
Concluding Remarks 
There are several manifestations of the rights of a person to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty. One such manifestation s the duty of the public 
prosecutor to prove all the elements constituting the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The defendant on the other hand, does not have to participate in the proof 
against him. There are, however, several ways by which the principle of 
presumption of innocence is violated in our criminal justice administration. 
First, there are provisions in the Criminal Code thatestablish the existence of an 
element of the crime, including intention/knowledge by presumption. When 
such presumption is rebuttable presumption, both the evidential and the legal 
burdens are shifted to the defendant in violation of the constitutional principle of 
the presumption of innocence and the notion of fundamental fairness in the 
administration of the criminal justice. And where the presumption is 
irrebuttable, it entirely nullifies the constitutional right of the accused to present 
evidence in his defence.  
The newly adopted Criminal Justice Administration Policy contemplates 
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in few serious crimes, such as, 
crimes against the constitution and the constitutional order, terrorism and 
organised crime. The nature of the presumption and the elements of the crime 
that can be proved by presumption are yet to be defined by the law. While the 
government, with all the resources and specialized justice institutions, is said to 
have found it difficult to prove the elements that constitute such crimes, it is 
clearly unfair to expect a defendant to be able to ffectively submit his defence 
once such element is presumed to exist. Moreover, it is a consistent practice that 
when a defendant challenges the admissibility of the confessions obtained 
during interrogation because of police misconduct, the courts require him to 
prove coercion.   
The presumptions in the Criminal Code operate in several crimes each of 
which constitutes and element of a serious offence. Th  crimes wherein proof by 
presumption is contemplated in the Criminal Justice Administration Policy are 
more serious and entail severe penalties. The fact th t these crimes are mostly 
non-bailable and severely punished should have beentak n as a deterrent not to 
use presumptions as proof in such matters. The additional predicament relates to 
                                          
178  This argument on difficulty of proof of facts cuts two ways - both for and against 
defendant. However, the difficulty of proving coercion emanates from the state's 
choice of the place, time and manner of interrogatin. The individual suspect does 
not choose where to be interrogated.  
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the lack of physical freedom of the defendant in order to gather evidence under a 
setting whereby the Public Defender's Office is almost non-existent. Even if 
courts may grant a defendant the opportunity for movement in order to obtain 
evidence and to contact witnesses, such permission by the court is not even as 
half effective as being released on bail to defend o eself. Such laws, policy and 
practices clearly nullify the principle of presumption of innocence enshrined in 
the Ethiopian Constitution and its constitutional vues.                                      ■
                                                                                                              
                                             
                                                              
                                                                                     
                                  
 
                                                                             
